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Abstract: In his book, The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson 
commented that Immanuel Kant’s argument in the second 
analogy “proceeds by a non sequitur of numbing grossness,” 
causing a fair amount of debates. Kant’s task in the second 
analogy is to argue that every event has a cause. Strawson 
criticizes Kant by claiming that in his argument, Kant not 
only changes the content of necessity but also shifts a 
conceptual necessity to a causal one. In this paper, I defend 
Kant’s second analogy against Strawson’s objection by 
arguing that Strawson misinterprets Kant’s strategy. 




n his book, The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson 
commented that Immanuel Kant’s argument in the 
second analogy “proceeds by a non sequitur of 
numbing grossness,” 1  causing a fair amount of 
debates. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s argument can 
be defended against Strawson’s objection because 
Strawson misinterprets Kant’s strategy. First, I will 
demonstrate Kant’s account of events; then, I evaluate 
Strawson’s argument; after that, I reconstruct Kant’s 
arguments that every event presupposes a cause; 
finally, I will briefly mention some philosophers’ 
comments on Strawson’s objection. In this paper, I use 
the following notations: capitalized letters, A and B, to 
represent the empirical objective states of an event; 
capitalized letters with p in subscript, Ap and Bp, to 
represent the perception or apprehension of an 
objective state of an event; “–” between letters to 
represent an event composed by two elements; pre-A 
to represent the presupposition from which the event 
A–B follows.  
I. Kant’s Account of Events and Objects 
The underlying question in Kant’s second analogy is: 
how are objective experiences of events possible? I 
argue that Kant has three requirements: 1) an event 
must be composed of two objective states; 2) an event 
must not follow from an empty time; 3) the two 
objective states must follow according to a rule of 
 
1 Strawson, 136. 
2 Kant, A192/B237. 
apprehension in the manifold, which means the order 
of the objective states is determined objectively. In this 
section, I discuss them in order. 
Kant first defines an event as “a perception 
that follows upon another perception.”2 An event must 
be composed of two parts, A and B. We cannot 
perceive an event unless something contained in state 
B is not part of state A. This is intuitive: I cannot 
perceive the event–e.g., the lights turned on–unless I 
perceive it is bright now and dark seconds ago. If it is 
always bright, I would never perceive an event. I use 
the notation A–B to represent the objective experience 
of an event, such that A is the preceding, and B the 
succeeding, objective state of appearances.   
Kant then claims that an event should not 
follow from empty time. He writes that “for an event 
which should follow upon an empty time, that is, a 
coming to be preceded by no state of things, is as little 
capable of being apprehended as empty time itself.”3 
To perceive an event without a preceding state implies 
that we can perceive empty time before perceiving 
such an event. Since Kant has already proved that 
empty time is not perceivable, it follows that there is 
always a pre-A preceding A–B. This requirement of an 
event is an ssential step in Kant’s argument for all 
events must have their causes. 
The third requirement, events must have a 
necessary objective order, takes a few steps to reason. 
First, to distinguish one event from all our 
apprehensions, i.e., pre-conceptual “sensory data,” we 
need a concept of such an event, similar to how we 
need concepts to distinguish objects from appre-
hensions. For example, I must have the concept of a 
table to experience the table in front of me; similarly, I 
also need the concept of “opening doors” to experience 
any specific door-opening event. Without such a 
concept, I cannot pick out relevant apprehensions from 
the manifold. For example, I might perceive a door 
opening and a person walking in at the same time. I 
need my concepts to distinguish which parts of my 
apprehension belong to which event; without the 
ability to distinguish, I would have no objective 
experience: I might perceive Ap–Bp as arbitrary 
apprehensions, but never A–B as objective events. 
Therefore, we must have concepts of events.  
A question that follows naturally from the 
third requirement is: what are some necessary rules of 
apprehension in the concepts of events? Strawson used 
3 Ibid. 
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the term “order-indifference”4 to mark the difference 
between the concepts of events and concepts of 
objects. Kant thinks that the concepts of an object or 
co-existing object parts have order-indifference. In 
contrast, the concepts of an event lack order-
indifference: i.e., there is a necessary order of Ap–Bp 
(Ap–Bp-irreversibility). Kant used examples of a house 
and a ship to demonstrate. 
My objective experience of a house contains a 
necessary rule of apprehension; however, the rules do 
not require the order of apprehension. 5  My 
apprehension of a house can either start with the roof 
or the basement: the rules of connection in the 
manifold guarantee that I can experience the house 
with order indifference. In contrast, the rule for an 
objective event requires a determined order. If a ship 
moves downstream, I always perceive it first in a 
position higher up, then lower down.6 In the event of 
A–B, I always perceive Ap–Bp-irreversibility. Ap–Bp 
alone is not enough for an objective experience of an 
event. I cannot perceive my objective concept A–B as 
sometimes Ap–Bp and sometimes Bp–Ap. One may 
argue that sometimes one does perceive the 
representation Bp–Ap: e.g., one can first see the ship in 
a position lower down, then see it higher up; she can 
reverse the engine. However, this kind of objection 
bears no significance. Kant does not need to argue that 
some representations never precede others; he only 
argues that in cases of events, the order of perceptions 
is necessary. One sure can perceive Bp–Ap; however, 
that would be a perception of event B–A instead of A–
B. 
Moreover, when one perceives the event B–A, 
she must perceive Bp–Ap-irreversibility. If I first 
perceive the room as dark, then the room as bright, I 
perceived the event of lights-turning-on; if I first 
perceive the room as bright, then the room as dark, I 
perceive the event of lights-turning-off. There is a clear 
difference between the two. Thus, we can conclude 
that for any event A–B, my perception of an event 
follows a necessary order, Ap–Bp-irreversibility.  
Lastly, why must Ap–Bp-irreversibility come 
from the rules under the concepts A–B? Kant claims: 
“we must derive the subjective succession of 
apprehension from the objective succession of 
appearances.”7  Since we need to have the objective 
 
4 Strawson, 132. 
5 Kant, A190-191/B235-236. 
6 Ibid., A192/B237. 
7 Ibid., A193/B238. 
experience, the necessity of our apprehensions must 
not come from our understanding; otherwise, the order 
of apprehension would be arbitrary. Kant writes, “the 
objective succession will therefore consist in that order 
of the manifold of appearance.”8 The objective order 
must be given to me in the manifold already. Like how 
I perceive an object, my apprehension must follow the 
specific rules of the manifold, according to which I 
cannot help but experience an object in a specific way. 
For example, I cannot resist experiencing a table 
upside-down if the rule in the manifold makes me do 
so; similarly, I cannot help but experience a door 
opening instead of closing if the rules in the manifold 
require it. Kant summarizes by saying that “this is 
another way of saying that I cannot arrange the 
apprehension otherwise than in this very succession.”9 
It is worth noting that Kant has not yet 
accomplished that an event A–B follows from a cause 
necessarily. Instead, Kant proves that one can 
experience the event only in the way the event 
happens: what I can experience is determined already 
in the manifold because my sensibility is merely 
passive and receptive. I will discuss Kant’s argument 
that all events are caused in section three. Briefly, Kant 
points out three requirements for the experience of an 
event. 1) An event must have two parts, A and B; 2) an 
event must follow from some other objective state, pre-
A; 3) the order of perception of an event is always 
necessary, such that Bp follows from Ap according to a 
rule in the manifold. I now reconstruct Strawson’s 
notorious non sequitur criticism on Kant’s Second 
Analogy. 
II. Strawson’s Non Sequitur Objection 
Strawson claims that Kant “not only shifts the 
application of the word ‘necessary,’ but also changes 
its sense substituting one type of necessity for 
another.”10  He reconstructs Kant’s premises as it is 
necessary that if A–B, then Ap–Bp-irreversibility; he 
writes,  
It is conceptually necessary, given that what is 
observed is, in fact, a change from A to B, and that 
there is no such difference in the causal conditions 
of the perception of these two states as to introduce 
a differential time-lag into the perception of A, that 
the observer’s perceptions should have the order: 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Strawson, 137. 
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perception of A, perception of B – and not the 
reverse order.11 
Strawson thinks that Ap’s dependence on A is the same 
as Bp’s dependence on B. James Van Cleve, in his 
reconstruction of Strawson, called this idea 
“perceptual isomorphism.” 12  Given that A–B and 
perceptual isomorphism, it conceptually necessarily 
follows that Ap–Bp-irreversibility. I think Kant would 
agree with this premise: one’s apprehension follows 
the order of her objective experience. For example, 
when I experience a door opening (A–B), I first have 
an apprehension of the door being closed (Ap), then 
have an apprehension of the door being open (Bp). 
Strawson thinks it is only a conceptual necessity that 
Ap–Bp-irreversibility follows from A–B because it is 
not the case that A–B caused the order of their 
apprehension to be necessary; the necessity follows 
from the concept of perceptual isomorphism.  
 Strawson then reads Kant’s conclusion as a 
causal necessity, as Kant describes in his thesis: 
“everything that happens, that is, begins to be, 
presupposes something upon which it follows 
according to a rule.”13 It is worth noting that Kant is 
not trying to argue A–B-necessity, objective state A 
causally necessitating objective state B. As Strawson 
points out that “Kant does not say that to conceive the 
order of perceptions of A and B as necessary is 
equivalent to conceiving A as causally necessitating B. 
He says that it is equivalent to conceiving the change 
from A to B as causally necessitated by some 
unspecified antecedent conditions.”14 In other words, 
Kant concludes that pre-A–(A–B)-necessity, for any 
event there presupposes a condition from which the 
event necessarily follows; instead of A–B-necessity, A 
causally necessitating B.  
Strawson thinks Kant cannot conclude that 
pre-A–(A–B)-necessity with the premise Ap–Bp-
irreversibility. Kant derived his conclusion by shifting 
the application of “necessity” from 1) necessarily if A–
B then Ap–Bp to 2) A–B necessarily follows from pre-
A. Simultaneously, the sense of “necessity” shifted 
from a conceptual necessity to a causal necessity. I 
agree that if this is Kant’s strategy, he would be guilty 
of non sequitur; however, I disagree that Kant’s 
argument proceeds in this direction. I argue Kant did 
not achieve pre-A–(A–B)-necessity through the 
necessary order of one’s perception of an event; 
 
11 Ibid. 
12Van Cleve, 82. 
13 Kant, A189. 
instead, Kant’s argument for the cause of events 
follows from the mere possibility of an objective 
experience of events. 
III. Kant’s Arguments for the Causal Principle 
In this section, I reconstruct Kant’s arguments that all 
events are caused basing on the mere possibility of 
objective experience. In previous sections, I have 
shown that Kant requires necessary relations between 
the two perceptions of an event: i.e., Ap–Bp-
irreversibility if A–B are events. Kant’s next step is to 
argue that any event A–B presupposes something, pre-
A, upon which it follows according to a rule: i.e., pre-
A–(A–B)-necessity. Kant’s argument is based on that 
certain rules are required for objectivity. He says, “I 
render my subjective synthesis of apprehension 
objective only by reference to a rule in accordance with 
which the appearances in their succession, that is, as 
they happen, are determined by the preceding state. 
The experience of an event [i.e., of anything as 
happening] is itself possible only on this 
assumption.”15 I now demonstrate Kant’s arguments. 
Kant argues that an event needs a determinate 
position in time to be objective.16 I do not need to know 
the precise time when an event happens; instead, Kant 
only claims that I have to put the event into the 
temporal framework to experience it: e.g., I have to 
know the door opens after I push the door and before 
the dog walks out. I have to provide every event with 
a determinate position in time to have experience. This 
is similar to how we must provide a determinate spot 
in space to experience an object. I cannot objectively 
experience an a-spatial table; similarly, I cannot say I 
experience an event without knowing its temporal 
position. The next question for Kant is, from what 
authority can events obtain a determinate temporal 
position? 
Recall from the last section that all events 
presuppose something preceding them, pre-A because 
we cannot perceive empty time. Kant argues that I have 
to presuppose that any event, A–B, necessarily follows 
from something preceding, pre-A, to satisfy the 
determined time relation. Moreover, since this time 
relation is objectively determined, there must be a 
governing rule in the manifold; I cannot provide such 
a rule myself, which would be arbitrary. Kant argues 
that “[an event] can acquire this determinate position 
14 Strawson, 137. 
15 Kant, A195/B240. 
16 Ibid., A198/B243. 
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in this relation of time only in so far as something is 
presupposed in the preceding state upon which it 
follows invariably, that is, in accordance with a rule.”17 
In other words, Kant argues that since all events have 
determined time relation, which can only derive from 
rules in the concept of objects, and that time only flows 
in one direction, we conclude that an event can only 
acquire its determinate time relation from its preceding 
cause.  
Back to Strawson’s objection, The Kantian 
concept of events has two necessities: (1) the necessary 
irreversible order of perception given any event and (2) 
the necessary temporal determination of an event given 
its preceding cause. I have shown that Kant's argument 
that every event has a cause does not follow from (1), 
which Strawson claims he does. Instead, Kant treats 
the entire event, A–B, as a whole and argues the event 
can only be experienced if it has a determined time 
relation, which should follow upon a rule. In our case, 
the rule for the ordering is causation. Strawson’s 
objection rests only on the assumption that Kant argues 
for objective causation based on subjective appre-
hensions; however, this is not the case. Therefore, 
Strawson’s objection fails. Next, I wish to defend 
Kant’s view against three possible objections.  
One possible objection Kant addressed is that 
events might acquire their determinate temporal 
relation directly from their relation to absolute time. If 
each event is marked with a specific time in the 
manifold, events will not follow from each other 
necessarily. For example, it could be the case that a 
rule in the manifold says that “Kant pushes the door at 
a second before five” and that “the door opens at five 
o’clock,” instead of “the door opens after Kant pushes 
it.” Since we have no access to the rules in the 
manifolds, how can we rule out the former option and 
claim that events must acquire their temporal relation 
through each other? 
Kant argued that “since absolute time is not an 
object of perception, this determination of position 
cannot be derived from the relation of appearances to 
it. On the contrary, the appearances must determine for 
one another their position in time and make their time-
order a necessary order.” 18  Appearances can only 
acquire determined relations from other appearances. 
Time is only the form of sensibility, which has no 
determinate markers to bear relations to appearances: 
the rules can only say A–B follows pre-A, but never 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., A200/B245. 
A–B happens at five o’clock because the absolute five 
o’clock is not an object of perception. Therefore, 
events must acquire their determined relations among 
each other according to the rules.  
Another possible objection Kant addressed is 
that there might be simultaneous causes. 19  For 
example, a lead ball is causing a hollow on a cushion. 
The ball must be on the cushion at the same time when 
the hollow exists; if I remove the ball, the hollow will 
disappear. Kant agrees that there could be 
simultaneous causation; however, he also pointed out, 
“it is the order of time, not the lapse of time, with 
which we have to reckon.”20 The order of time still 
exists even when there is no lapse in time. Let us 
scrutinize the event: a hollow appears on a cushion: the 
first perception is a flat cushion, A; the second 
perception is a cushion with a hollow, B; the condition 
is the placing of the lead ball, pre-A. We can see that 
the posit of pre-A will necessarily lead to the event, A–
B, where A–B would not lead to pre-A. Therefore, we 
can determine that the event A–B shall follow pre-A in 
the order of time. The necessary temporal relation is 
determined by order of time, not the lapse of time. 
Here is another possible objection: why must 
it be the case that what determines the temporal 
relation between events corresponds to what we 
perceive as causal relations? We perceive so many 
events at any given time, even if there must be some 
pre-A; how do we know it picks out the one we want, 
i.e., the one of causation? Take the door-opening event 
for example: I pushed the door, then the door opens. 
The moment right before I open the door, I happen to 
turn on the lights as well. In this case, we have two pre-
A candidates for the event A–B of door-opening: (1) 
turning on the lights and (2) pushing the door. (2) 
causally determines A–B while (1) is just a random 
event; however, they both can determine A–B in 
temporal order. How can we guarantee that the rules in 
the manifold are the causal relation? 
I think Kant would argue that, if it is the case 
that we arrange door-opening after lights-turning-on, 
then we would think that lights-turning-on causes 
door-opening. However, we do arrange door-opening 
after door-pushing, and we know this because we 
perceive door-pushing as causing door-opening. The 
rules already determine the causal relations in the 
manifold. We are in no position to alter; otherwise, our 
experience is not objective. If it is really the case that 
19 Ibid., A202-203/B247-248. 
20 Ibid., A203/B248. 
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lights-turning-on causes door opening, potentially how 
alien determines event order, then they will not feel 
weird about this determination. An alien philosopher 
might ask why it is not the case that door-pushing 
causes door-opening; a similar response is available. 
Objective experience requires rules coming from the 
manifold. Kant does not have to worry if the 
determined temporal order mismatches with causation 
because it is causation.  
From the above argument, we can get two 
consequences, as Kant claimed: “in the first place, I 
cannot reverse the series, placing that which happens 
prior to that upon which it follows. And secondly, if 
the state which precedes is posited, this determinate 
event follows inevitably and necessary.” 21  I cannot 
reverse the objective series because of the governing 
rules in the manifolds; events inevitably follow from 
their conditions. If the necessary time relation fails, no 
appearances would be possible at all. Kant says that 
“the principle of sufficient reason is thus the ground of 
possible experiences, that is, of objective knowledge 
of appearances in respect of their relation in the order 
of time.”22 
In brief, Kant first argues that for any event A–
B, one necessarily presupposes something, pre-A, 
before A–B. Also, for both pre-A and A–B to be 
objective, i.e., not merely subjective apprehensions, 
they need to have temporal positions. Their relation-
ship is determined in the objects, according to rules in 
the manifolds. Finally, Kant shows that pre-A and A–
B’s temporal position can only derive from relating to 
each other rather than relating to absolute time. Kant 
concludes that to experience any event A–B, one needs 
to presuppose from something Pre-A, from which A–
B necessarily follows according to a rule.  
I wish to clarify that the causation defended in 
the second analogy might not be as strong as our 
ordinary conception of causation: it is only a necessity 
for our objective and conceptual experiences of events. 
In our everyday life, we may think causation is a real 
relation between real events in the world. For example, 
my throwing of rock actually causes a window to 
break. However, Kant would argue that the causation 
is only necessary because my perception of the rock-
throwing precedes my perception of the window 
breaking. Although this may sound unsatisfactory, it is 
not because the Kantian strategy is inadequate. Instead, 
 
21 Ibid., A198/B243-244. 
22 Ibid., A201/B246. 
23Allison, 255. 
it is because we ask too much of necessity in our 
everyday life. We cannot directly access the objects in 
themselves; thus, we cannot attribute causation to 
them. 
IV. Commentators’ Replies to Strawson 
Henry Allison argues that Strawson’s non sequitur 
objection assumes a “transcendentally realistic 
standpoint.”23 He claims that Strawson “treats Kant as 
if he were an empirical idealist, concerned to ground a 
conclusion regarding the causal relations of 
ontologically distinct things and events on a feature of 
our perceptions (their irreversibility).” 24  Strawson’s 
objection would be sound if Kant shifts the causal 
necessity of objective experience to the causal 
necessity of objects in themselves; however, we are not 
even entitled to argue for order in the noumenal world. 
At the beginning of his argument, Kant claimed that 
“how things may be in themselves, apart from the 
representations through which they affect us, is 
entirely outside our sphere of knowledge.”25 One has 
to pay attention to the requirement that objects in the 
phenomenal realm need to be constructed by us 
according to the rules.  
Lewis Beck also points out that Kant does not 
draw the inference Strawson objects against, namely 
from Ap–Bp-irreversibility to A–B-irreversibility, 
which would be a non sequitur. Beck claims that the 
former is only one evidence for me to know an event 
A–B, where the latter is a rule which is also necessary 
for me to regard A–B as a necessary event26, which I 
think Kant derived independently from the former. The 
apprehension’s irreversibility is necessary under the 
concept of any event, while the causal necessity rests 
on the objective temporal order of appearances. The 
rule and the evidence together enable us to experience 
events objectively. 
Michael Rosen points out that Strawson is 
wrong by assuming series of events and asking 
whether those events are objective; however, for Kant, 
one only has series of apprehensions that need to be 
synthesized into objective events. Kant’s project is to 
determine the rules, according to which we can match 
our subjective apprehensions to the objective 
experience. He writes that “the constraint upon those 
rules is that they must be such as to allow us to order 
what is given to us into a seamless and coherent 
24 Ibid. 
25 Kant, A191/B235. 
26 Beck, 389. 
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reality.” 27  Without such rules, e.g., causation, the 
objective experience is impossible.  
Conclusion 
Commentators disagree on whether Kant argues that 
objective state B follows from objective state A 
according to a rule, or he argues that the event A–B 
follows from a presupposed pre-A according to a rule. 
I think this distinction is subtle: whether causation 
resides between objective states or between events. 
Both objective states and events belong to our 
objective experience, where they necessarily require a 
relative temporal position. Kant’s argument flows on 
both reads of his causality, where Strawson’s objection 
flows on neither.  
Kant argued that under the concept of any 
event, the perceptions must acquire necessary orders. 
Strawson reads this necessity as the reason Kant uses 
to prove that every event has a cause, on which He 
charged Kant of shifting both the application and the 
sense of necessity in his argument. However, I argue 
that Kant’s argument does not advance in the direction 
Strawson attributed to him; Kant achieved the causal 
necessity based on the relative temporal order between 
event, which is required for our objective experience; 
instead of the conceptually necessary perceptual 
isomorphism, on which Strawson based his attack. I 
think Strawson mistakenly read Kant’s argument of 
pre-A–(A–B)-necessity as following from Ap–Bp-
irreversibility; however, Kant’s arguments are based 
on the necessity of our experience of events. Therefore, 
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